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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930272-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(i)(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. The trial court did not err when it determined there were 
unique and/or exception circumstances which warranted the 
distribution of the Defendant's pre-marital property. 
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact. 
The applicable standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard. 
The appellate court may disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact 
only if such findings are clearly erroneous. Haaan v. Hagan, 810 
P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 
(Utah App. 1991). The appellate court should also review the trial 
court's decision if in fact the appellate court makes a 
determination that the decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse 
of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 P. 2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 
1988). 
II. The trial court did not err when it did not apply 
partnership dissolution rules when it reallocated the Defendant's 
pre-marital property after determining that the parties had a 
partnership relationship prior to the solemnization of their 
marriage. 
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact. 
The applicable standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard. 
The appellate court may disturb the Findings of Fact only if such 
findings are clearly erroneous. Haaan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 
(Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 
1991). The appellate court should also review the trial court's 
decision if in fact the appellate court makes a determination that 
the decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion. 
Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988). 
III. Respondent is entitled to an award of her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to Appellant's 
appeal? 
The award of attorney's fees on appeal is based on the 
authority of Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as 
a sanction for frivolous appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND LAW 
The statutory law that is determinative to the issues 
presented in this brief are: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
the parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction -
Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(2) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; . . . Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
33(a) UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court 
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter comes before the appellate court for the second 
time. The trial court originally ruled that the parties had a 
marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980 (R. 99, 103) 
(though the marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984) and 
distributed the property of the parties on the basis that they had 
a common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. (R. 
147). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to properly 
categorize the parties1 property as marital or pre-marital based on 
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the marriage date of October 5, 1984. (R. 210). The Court of 
Appeals then instructed the trial court to consider whether unique 
or exceptional circumstances existed meriting premarital property 
to be included in the marital estate. 
On remand, the trial court determined that "unique 
circumstances" existed allowing the court to exercise its 
discretion to reallocate pre-marital property. (R. 231). In 
particular, the court determined that Plaintiff had made a 
substantial contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate 
assets. The Plaintiff helped arrange for and make considerable 
improvements to Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed as well as to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing 
at the time. Further, Defendant's realty was acquired and improved 
during the time of the marriage and prior to the marriage, during 
which times the parties were commingling their earnings and 
efforts, and as such the court found that said assets were 
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. (R. 
233). On such basis, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff was 
entitled to a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital property. (R. 
232). 
There are principally three parcels of real property which are 
at issue: Parcel 1, located in a trailer park at 625 South 50 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; Parcel 2, located in a trailer park at 
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; and Parcel 3, located at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Parcel 1 was acquired by the Defendant on May 27, 1980. 
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Plaintiff and her friends performed substantial labor and 
improvements on the Parcel 1 as well as to the Plaintiff fs 1974 72-
foot Concord mobile home located thereon. Glenda Edwards observed 
Plaintiff using a roto-tiller and tractor to prepare the yard for 
sod, which roto-tiller and tractor was purchased by Plaintiff. 
(Tr. 10, 11). Leo Webber, a friend of Plaintiff, helped put in the 
driveway; laid brick around the skirting of the trailer; tore out 
the closet and relocated it in the trailer; and made numerous 
repairs, all at no charge. These services were performed as 
arranged by Plaintiff and assisted by Plaintiff. (Tr. 14, 15, 16). 
Another friend of Plaintiff, Lester Freeman, helped lay two 
sections of driveway (Tr. 22) which was accomplished in two pours 
with tools provided by Lester Freeman (Tr. 23). Another friend of 
Plaintiff, Janice Copes, observed Plaintiff doing yard work which 
included sod, flowers and trees on Parcel 1. (Tr. 26). 
Plaintiff herself testified that she personally arranged and 
assisted with the following improvements on Parcel 1: sewer; water 
and gas lines; helped pour slab under trailer; poured driveway; 
assemble out buildings; level ground and put in grass. (Tr. 33). 
The improvements were arranged by Plaintiff with the labor being 
performed by Plaintiff's friends at no charge. (Tr. 34). The 
Plaintiff also assisted in making substantial improvements to her 
own 1974 72-foot Concord mobile home. The improvements to the 
trailer include the following: closet built in living room; sheet 
rocking and window change in living room; floor built up in back of 
living room; and bar put in living room. (Tr. 35). Plaintiff also 
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testified that the trailer would be severely damaged, especially in 
regards to the closet and sheet rocking, if it were moved from its 
present location. (Tr. 35). 
Parcel 2 was acquired in 1985 after the parties were married. 
Plaintiff and her friends performed the following labor and 
improvements on Parcel 2: poured pad for mobile home (Tr. 16); 
poured driveway; and installed plumbing, water lines and gas lines. 
(Tr. 37). All of the work performed by Plaintiff and her friends 
was at no charge. (Tr. 17). Subsequent to the improvements set 
forth above, Defendant's 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home was 
relocated on Parcel 2. Prior to relocation, said mobile home was 
used for storage purposes. (Tr. 37, 38). Prior to becoming 
habitable, Plaintiff cleaned out Defendant's trailer; painted 
inside of trailer; and put up siding and painted the siding. (Tr. 
37). 
Parcel 3 was purchased by Defendant in August of 1977 with a 
down payment of $2,200 with annual payments toward the balance of 
$5,800 in amounts of $1,000 each. Defendant made the final payment 
for Parcel 3 in the amount of $1,682.15 in 1984 or 1985. (Tr. 74, 
75). Plaintiff and her friends contributed labor toward the 
following improvements on Parcel 3: cement for floor; laid pipe 
and concrete for reinforcing; poured concrete; finished concrete; 
and started building the structure. (Tr. 17). The labor performed 
by Plaintiff and her friends was at no cost to Defendant. The 
following services were also performed by Plaintiff in improving 
Parcel 3: backfilling and levelling; laying PVC pipe; mesh and 
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rebar; and organizing work crew to raise building. (Tr. 39). 
The trial court found that Parcels 1 and 3 were Defendant's 
pre-marital property, whereas each of the parties1 had a one-half 
interest in Parcel 2. The court then determined that based upon 
unique circumstances, the court would exercise its discretion to 
reallocate pre-marital property and as such the court awarded 
Parcel 1 to the Plaintiff and Parcels 2 and 3 to the Defendant. 
On April 21, 1993, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal 
from the decision rendered by Judge Ray M. Harding. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There were unique and exceptional circumstances which 
warranted the trial court in reallocating the Defendant's pre-
marital property. The facts and circumstances which the trial 
court listed were unique and in fact established that Plaintiff in 
this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth of 
Defendantfs separate assets and that the assets were accumulated 
and/or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. 
The circumstances considered by the court in determining 
whether or not unique and exceptional circumstances occurred are as 
follows: whether one spouse has made any contribution for the 
growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the 
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the 
parties; amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; source of the 
property; health of the parties; the parties1 standard of living; 
respective financial conditions; needs and earning capacity; the 
7 
duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the 
parties' ages at the time of marriage and at divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and a necessary relationship that 
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support 
to be awarded; whether on spouse has made any contribution toward 
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether 
the aseets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the 
parties. 
The trial court found that from January of 1980 until the time 
the parties were married, the nature of the parties1 relationship 
for all intents and purposes was a partnership. Because 
Defendantfs realty at issue was acquired and improved during the 
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and 
efforts, the court found that such assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. The source of the 
property was that of purchase by Defendant in each of the cases of 
the pre-marital property. However, Plaintiff was also a financial 
contributor to the relationship which allowed Defendant the ability 
to pool his resources and use for the purchase of said properties. 
Were it not for Plaintiff's help however, Defendant would have 
needed to use his resources in other manners and would not have 
been able to purchase said properties. The term "partnership" was 
used by the court to describe the parties' pre-marital 
relationship. The court is entitled to look at pre-marital and 
post-marital property in making a property distribution. The court 
then went on to say that during the time of the beginning of their 
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relationship up until the time of their separation subsequent to 
the ceremonial marriage, Plaintiff made substantial contributions 
toward the growth of the separate assets of Defendant, which assets 
were accumulated and enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. 
Based upon Plaintiff's efforts of contributing toward Defendant's 
separate assets which were accumulated by the joint efforts of the 
parties, the court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to a 
distribution of the Defendant's pre-marital property. As such, 
partnership distribution rules are not dispositive and in fact the 
partnership relationship was only considered in the larger context 
of the contributions made by Plaintiff toward the separate assets 
of Defendant before and after the ceremonial marriage. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred to respond to Appellant's appeal by virtue of Rule 
33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that the court 
has established by its specific findings that Plaintiff has made 
substantial contributions toward the growth of the separate assets 
of Defendant which were accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties. As such, there has been no abuse of 




THERE WERE UNIQUE AND/OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WARRANTED 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY. 
The trial court acknowledged the general rule cited in Haumont 
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v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) which states that 
typically, each party is to "retain the separate property he or she 
brought into the marriage." At 424. (R. 231). It further noted 
that trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital 
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. (R. 231). Such 
unique circumstances include those set forth in paragraphs 10A-L of 
the court's findings and conclusions signed October 5, 1989, but 
are not necessarily limited to those findings. The court also 
considered the following exceptional circumstances outlined in 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) in effectuating an 
equitable distribution of the marital and pre-marital property. 
The court then went on to find that Defendant's realty at issue was 
acquired and improved during the time in which the parties were 
commingling their earnings and efforts, and that as such the assets 
that are in dispute were accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties. 
Both parties derived benefits from their pre- and post-marital 
relationship with the other party. The Defendant helped Plaintiff 
satisfy debts that Plaintiff brought into the relationship. On the 
other hand, Plaintiff allowed the Defendant to live in her trailer, 
which was on property that was brought into the marriage, which 
trailer was habitable and in excellent condition. Defendant's 
trailer, on the other hand, was uninhabitable when the parties 
first met and later became habitable only because of the extensive 
work that Plaintiff spent in cleaning and repairing the trailer. 
Furthermore, Defendant had a place to stay in town when he returned 
10 
such that it was not necessary for him to maintain his own trailer. 
During the period of time that Defendant was away at work, 
Plaintiff arranged for and made physical improvements to 
Defendants realty. A substantial amount of the improvements were 
performed by Plaintiff and her friends at no cost to Defendant 
except for materials. Furthermore, Plaintiff was expending income 
on behalf of the Defendant which allowed the Defendant to use 
earnings from his income to be applied towards the materials for 
the improvements as well as payments on the parcels of real 
property. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for Defendant to 
use a substantial amount of his resources to pay the ongoing 
expenses that Plaintiff was otherwise satisfying and Defendant 
would not have had the resources to pay for materials and payments 
on additional parcels of property. 
It is evident that the trial court's findings are not 
erroneous and that Defendant has not met his burden of establishing 
that the findings were clearly erroneous. There was ample 
testimony by Plaintiff and a host of other witnesses that 
substantial services were performed by Plaintiff and her friends 
which substantially improved pre-marital assets of Defendant and 
that the parties1 commingled their earnings and efforts to the 
benefit of Defendant. While it is true that Defendant himself 
testified contrary, the court chose to believe Plaintiff and her 
witnesses as well as the valuations and the evidence supporting 
Plaintiff's position and the court's decision. In any event, the 
judge's ruling was not clearly erroneous. The record is clear that 
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there were unique circumstances which warrant the reallocation of 
the Defendant's pre-marital property. The trial court's decision 
is clearly just and is most definitely not a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT APPLY PARTNERSHIP 
DISSOLUTION RULES WHEN IT REALLOCATED THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-MARITAL 
PROPERTY AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE PARTIES HAD A PARTNERSHIP 
RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE. 
The court found that from January of 1980 until the time of 
the parties1 marriage, the parties commingled their earnings and 
efforts in such a way as to establish for all intents and purposes 
a partnership. (R. 232). The term "partnership" was used by the 
court to describe the relationship between the parties and in 
particular the arrangements that they had made in regards to 
Plaintiff arranging for and making improvements upon the real 
property and mobile homes, and also being responsible for many of 
the day-to-day expenses incurred by the parties, with Defendant on 
the other hand being responsible for the major expenses such as 
purchasing of property and making the ongoing payments as well as 
costs of materials for improvements. At no time did the court 
state that the parties had engaged in an official partnership which 
would require dissolution at the time of the parties1 marriage. As 
set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court determined in Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), that under unique and 
exceptional circumstances a court may award property such that one 
party would be entitled to an equitable share of pre-marital assets 
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brought by the other party into the marriage. The court 
specifically applied the standards required by the Court of 
Appeals. Defendant's attempt to circumvent the court's ruling by 
arguing that partnership dissolution laws should apply to these 
particular parties1 relationship is an attempt to reap the 
substantial benefit derived by Defendant as a result of the 
contributions made by Plaintiff toward the growth of the separate 
assets of Defendant, which assets were substantially enhanced by 
both parties1 efforts. 
The parties1 partnership-like relationship prior to their 
actual ceremonial marriage is an indication of the joint efforts of 
the parties to accumulate and enhance assets that Defendant brought 
into the marriage. As such, the parties1 partnership-like 
relationship is an exceptional circumstance that the court should 
consider in determining an equitable distribution of the marital 
and pre-marital property. This was the approach of the trial court 
and is not clearly erroneous nor is there an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, the Findings of Fact accurately set forth the 
considerations contemplated by the trial court in the pre-marital, 
partnership-like relationship. 
The trial court should not have applied partnership 
dissolution rules when reallocating Defendant's pre-marital 
property. The partnership-like relationship that occurred between 
the parties prior to the marriage was correctly considered by the 
trial court in establishing whether or not unique circumstances 




RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER REASONABLE ATTORNEYS 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANTS APPEAL. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the 
court to award attorney fees and costs as a sanction for a 
frivolous appeal. 
in Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) this court 
ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when 
an appeal is obviously without merit and has been taken 
with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results 
in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower 
court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of 
the time and resources of the Law Court, [citation] 
Therefore, we award costs and attorney fees on appeal to 
[respondent]. 
The Porco court so ruled even though it "recognize[d] that 
sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious 
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions." 
Likewise, in Fife v. Fife, 777 P.2d 512 (Utah App. 1989) this 
court imposed sanctions in the form of attorney fees incurred on 
appeal because of frivolous appeals. Both of these cases were 
remanded for a determination of the amount to be awarded. In 
neither of these cases was this court concerned with the 
Respondent's need for the award. 
Here, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in this appeal under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined by 
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Porco. Under this Rule Respondent seeks either the entire amount 
of her reasonable fees or such amount as may be determined to have 
been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court find 
frivolous, if this court finds the appeal only partially frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err when it determined that unique 
circumstances existed sufficient to warrant the reallocation of 
Defendant's pre-marital property. The Plaintiff's contributions of 
time, money and work effort, as well as those of her friends, and 
Plaintiff's efforts to organize and make arrangements for others to 
perform labors at no cost to Defendant greatly enhanced the pre-
marital properties accumulated by Defendant. There was ample 
testimony considered by the court to support this position and as 
such the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous nor is 
the court's decision unjust or an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court concluded that the parties' relationship from 
June of 1980 until the time of their marriage was, for all intents 
and purposes, a partnership-like relationship. This consideration 
was properly applied by the court and considered as a possible 
exceptional circumstance to justify reallocation of Defendant's 
pre-marital property, rather than using said the partnership-like 
relationship to rationalize using partnership dissolution rules. 
The Plaintiff asks that the Court of Appeals affirm the trial 
court in all respects and that Plaintiff be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the appeal. 
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DATED this 20th day of October, 1993. 
DANA D. BURROWS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of October, 1993, I did 
mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Robert L. 
Moody, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 2525 North Canyon Rd., 
Provo, Utah 84604. 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 872408 
vs . 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court after defendant's appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. The appellate court has remanded 
for this court's further consideration of the division of the 
parties' property. Consistent with the appellate court's 
decision, this court amends its prior ruling and finds that the 
parties' marriage began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. 
Accordingly, parcels of real estate purchased by defendant prior 
to that date are deemed pre-marital property. 
This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party is 
typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage." However, as the Court of Appeals properly noted, 
trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital 
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. This Court 
finds that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant 
a reallocation of defendant's premarital property so as to grant 
the parcel upon which plaintiff's trailer is situated to the 
plaintiff as was awarded in this court's original Amended Decree 
of Divorce. 
Such unique circumstances include those set forth in 
paragraph 10(a-l) of the Court's Findings and Conclusions signed 
October 5, 1989. In summary, the Court finds that from January 
1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled 
their earnings and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all 
intents and purposes, a partnership. The nature of the parties' 
relationship and plaintiff's contributions of time and money to 
partnership endeavors entitles plaintiff to a reallocation of 
defendant's "premarital property" in the manner described in the 
Court's Amended Decree. 
After full consideration of the factors suggested in Burke 
v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Court finds that 
unique circumstances exist in this case. This Court has given 
special attention to the factor most emphasized by the Supreme 
Court: "Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has 
made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of 
the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." Id. Plaintiff in 
this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth 
of defendant's separate assets. As the Court noted in its 
Findings and Conclusions, plaintiff helped arrange for and make 
considerable improvements to defendant's realty on which her 
mobile home was placed and to another parcel that defendant was 
purchasing at the time. Further, because defendant's realty at 
issue was acquired and improved during the time in which the 
parties were commingling their earnings and efforts, the Court 
finds that such assets "were accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties." Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to 
an equitable share of such assets, i.e., she is entitled to the 
parcel on which her mobile home was placed. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days 
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision 
has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1992. 
cc: Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5405 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center ^ 
Orem, Utah 84057 ... . ~--
 n *-
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 ^7/ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Civil No. CV 87 2408 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of 
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court has remanded for this 
Court's further consideration the division of the parties1 
property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The 
parties each introduced several exhibits and stated their 
stipulations into the record. Being thereby and otherwise fully 
apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding 
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, now hereby enters the 
following: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Consistent with the Appellate Courtfs decision, this 
Court amends its prior ruling and finds that the parties1 marriage 
began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. Accordingly, parcels 
of real property purchased by Defendant prior to that date are 
deemed premarital property, 
2. This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont 
v, Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party 
is typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought 
into the marriage." However as the Court of Appeals properly 
noted, trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital 
property" where "unique circumstances" exist• Id. This Court finds 
that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant a 
reallocation of Defendants premarital property so as to grant the 
parcel upon which Plaintiff's trailer is situated to the Plaintiff 
as was awarded in this Court's original Amended Decree of Divorce. 
3. Such unique circumstances include those set forth below: 
A* The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
B. At the time they met, Plaintiff resided in her 
mobile home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes 
required temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided 
missile sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when 
not on TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her 
mobile home. 
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C. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own 
name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At 
that same time the parties moved Plaintiff! s mobile home onto that 
pad where they continued to cohabit. Defendant paid for the costs 
of moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
D. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
E. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arrange for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's rdalty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such 
improvements included the laying of concrete pads at each location, 
leveling, laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction 
of outbuildings and a metal building. 
F* While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
G. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
H. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S.,, the Utah State Tax Commission, 
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an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
I. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
J. Defendant listed his address on his federal and 
state income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah—the same as Plaintiff's residence—for each of the years 
1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. 
K. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in 
his federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
L. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
4. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,, Utah, continuously since on or 
about May 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a Imember of- the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
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has been the minorfs only home. 
5. Defendant has been emplqyed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since! 1967 through the time of trial. 
6. During the parties1 marriage, Plaintiff has been an 
employee of United Stated Steel Corporation except for a period 
when her employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was 
the location where she was employed. At the time of the original 
trial, Plaintiff had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period 
of approximately one year. 
7. As of the date of the original trial Defendant was the 
record owner of four parcels of r.ealty, to wit: 
A. Parcel 1— 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintifffs aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72-foot 
Concord. 
B. Parcel 2 — 
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home. 
C. Parcel 3 — 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
D. Parcel 4 — 
746 West 600 North,, Orem, Utah. 
8. Parcel 1 was deeded to defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 
2 was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of Parcel 3 in July 1977, reciting 
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a down payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward the balance 
of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to commence in 
June 1978. Defendant made a final payment for Parcel 3 in the 
amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May 1981. The parties have stipulated 
that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem parcel and 
that he is listed as legal owner of Parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of the original trial in the amount of 
approximately $5,000.00. 
9* The Walters' marriage began on October 5, 1984, and as 
such all marital property acquired prior to that time is premarital 
property of Defendant. Specifically, Parcels 1, 3 and 4 are 
premarital property of Defendant, whereas each of the parties has 
a 50% interest in Parcel 2. 
10. The Court now considers the following exceptional 
circumstances in effectuating an equitable distribution of the 
marital and premarital property: whether one spouse has made any 
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other 
spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the 
joint efforts of the parties; amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired before or during the 
marriage; source of the property; health of the parties; the 
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs 
and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of 
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the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of marriage and of divorce; 
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship that property division has with the amount of alimony 
and child support to be awarded. 
11. The court finds that based upon the exceptional 
circumstances set forth in paragraph 10 above, that Parcels 1, 3 
and 4 were acquired prior to the actual marriage but during the 
time period that the parties were actually cohabiting as applied to 
Parcels 1 and 3. It appears that Parcel 4 was purchased prior to 
the time that the parties were cohabiting but that payments were 
made subsequent to cohabitation. 
12. Plaintiff in this case clearly made a substantial 
contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate assets. As the 
Court noted in its Findings and Conclusions, Plaintiff helped 
arrange for and make considerable improvements to Defendantf s 
realty on which her mobile home was placed and to another parcel 
the Defendant was purchasing at the time. Further, because 
Defendant's realty at issue was acquired and improved during the 
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and 
efforts, the Court finds that such assets "were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.11 
13. The source of the property was that of the purchase by 
Defendant in each of the cases of the premarital properties. 
However, Plaintiff was also a financial contributor to the 
relationship which allowed Defendant the ability to pool his 
resources and use for the purchase of said properties. Were it not 
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for Plaintiff1s help however, Defendant would have needed to use 
his resources in other manners and would not have been able to 
purchase said properties. 
14. The court finds that each of the parties are in good 
health. The parties each have, standards of living that are 
reasonably consistent with that prior to entry into the marriage. 
However, Plaintiff was not employed for a period of time at the 
request of Defendant which has injured the Plaintiff as it relates 
to retirement and the opportunity to purchase items on her own 
while the parties were living together but prior to their marriage 
which occurred over a period of four to five years. 
15. The parties were married for approximately three years 
prior to separation and lived together for a period of seven years 
total. The duration of the marriage was approximately five years 
and there are no children of this marriage, though Plaintiff has a 
child from a prior marriage who is presently age 16. 
16. Defendant has no child support or alimony obligation to 
the Plaintiff and as such the property division is critical because 
it is the main asset that remains to be divided. 
17. The court finds that Plaintiff has made substantial 
contributions toward the purchase and growth of the separate assets 
of Defendant, in particular Parcels 1, 3 and 4 and as such the 
value of the properties has been enhanced by the efforts of 
Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff during the parties1 
relationship prior to the marriage was gainfully employed and spent 
a substantial portion of her income to provide food and clothing 
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for the parties as well as purchase of a transmission for 
Defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff also purchased a majority of the 
tools that were used to improve the properties which had a cost to 
the Plaintiff of approximately $500. Plaintiff also engaged in 
physical labor on the properties such as laying the PVC pipe and 
wire mesh and rebar for the cement slabs. Plaintiff also acted as 
a hod carrier in the brick work that was performed as well as 
sheetrocking, taping, sanding and painting the structures. The 
Plaintiff also cleaned and painted the trailer that is awarded to 
Defendant and leveled the ground where it is presently located. 
Plaintiff also supported Defendant by working in the parties1 
residence while they cohabited anjd performed domestic labors that 
benefitted Defendant as well. Plaintiff was willing to be engaged 
in employment outside of the home but didn't do so at the request 
of Defendant. 
18. Defendant previously testified at the original trial on 
February 7, 1989, as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels, 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties previously stipulated to this court's 
acceptance into evidence of written appraisals of the parcels 
offered by Plaintiff and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a 
Certified Review Appraiser. This court considered Mr. Lamoreaux's 
assessment of the valuation of the parcels more credible than 
Defendant's own assessment for the following reasons: 
A* Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
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on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or nonexistence of public improvements, adverse 
easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, insulation, 
adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and marketability, 
remaining economic life, availability for expansion, comparisons to 
recent sale of similar and proximate properties, income potential, 
highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
B. Defendant testified to having no significant 
training or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar 
properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed ont he properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
19. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
20. Defendant now submits additional appraisals stating the 
values of Parcel 1 as $24,675.00 and Parcel 2 as $17,500.00. 
21. The court finds that the appraisals by Mr. Lamoreaux have 
previously been adopted by the court and that the issue of 
valuation of the properties is not in dispute and was not reversed 
by the Court of Appeals. As such, the court will not consider the 
values set forth in the appraisals by Defendant's most recent 
appraiser, but will rather affirm the values as established by Mr. 
Lamoreaux. 
22. Each party is entitled to one-half of the other parties1 
retirement that accrued from the commencement of the ceremonial 
marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce. Each party shall 
cooperate and provide the appropriate information to the other 
party so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders can be 
implemented to that affect. 
23. Each party should be responsible for their own attorney's 
fees and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by 
the Court of Appeals. 
24. The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
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Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus 
any accruing interest. This judgment represents $400 from 
Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
25. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with or owing for the realty, 
improvements and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable considering the exceptional 
circumstances which are considered during the time that the parties 
lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing to the time 
periods during which such equities were acquired in relation to the 
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marital relationship that existed between the parties after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monetary values of the properties, owing to the fact that 
Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor performed and 
arranged which improved the properties, owing to the fact that 
Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for Defendant 
which freed up Defendant's income -co make the actual payments on 
the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to the age of 
the parties and the duration of the marriage and the fact that 
Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the request of 
Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no alimony or child 
support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the real property is 
the only remaining assets to be divided and owing to the fact that 
Plaintifff s contributions toward the growth of Defendant! s separate 
property vastly enhanced the value of said properties. 
2. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
3. Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other 
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party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties' 
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce, Both 
parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to 
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may 
be implemented. 
4. Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees 
and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. 
5. The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus 
any accruing interest. This judgment represents $400 from 
Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
DATED this J%3 day ofJMarph7^1993. 
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4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the-foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this "S day of 
March, 1993. 
Robert L. Moody 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, UT 84604 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5405 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Civil No. CV 87 2408 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of 
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court has remanded for this 
Court's further consideration the division of the parties' 
property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The 
parties each introduced several exhibits and stated their 
stipulations into the record. Being thereby and otherwise fully 
apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding 
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following 




1. A Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
entered on October 5, 1989. 
2. The Defendant having appealed several of the issues to 
the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals having rendered a 
ruling and having remanded to this Court for further consideration 
of the division of personal property: 
A. Plaintiff shall be awarded as her equitable share of 
the parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant is 
ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
B. Defendant shall retain all right, title and 
interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements—including 
the mobile home—situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 
North, Highland, Utah. 
C. Such division is equitable considering the 
exceptional circumstances which are considered during the time that 
the parties lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing 
to the time periods during which such equities were acquired in 
relation to the marital relationship that existed between the 
parties after solemnization of their marriage, owing to the 
respective contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the 
properties by each party, owing to the fact that such division 
preserves the long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor 
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daughter as well as the minor's school and religious associations, 
and owing to the fact that such division approximates a near equal 
division of the monetary values of the properties, owing to the 
fact that Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor 
performed and arranged which improved the properties, owing to the 
fact that Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for 
Defendant which freed up Defendant's income to make the actual 
payments on the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to 
the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage and the 
fact that Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the 
request of Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no 
alimony or child support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the 
real property is the only remaining assets to be divided and owing 
to the fact that Plaintiff's contributions toward the growth of 
Defendant's separate property vastly enhanced the value of said 
properties. 
3. Defendant shall be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
4. Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other 
party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties' 
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce. Both 
parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to 




5. Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees 
and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. 
6. The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect. 
This judgment represents $400 from Defendant's Deseret Bank account 
and $2,750 from Defendant's America First Thrift account. 
Defendant should be awarded the remainder of each account. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
DATED this ^ 3 day o 
Jlffi€£-RAY M. HARDING 
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy Q £ thgl^ orego-incf 
mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this°v:V»J> wday of h
'
i993
- *<z^&?y was March 
Robert L. Moody 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, UT 84604 
^ ^ W ^ v ^ r -
DANA D. BURROWS 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ F[J j p 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY Ss? " cf 
• • • * * • • * * • * * • * * * * • * * * 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * • • * • * • • • • 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
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property such as would be expected of a married couple. The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years or months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement 
benefits. 
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The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property. The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear. 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties.. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
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Dated this 15th day of February, 1989 
BY 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
363 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. BOX 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
V 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. 
| FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
| NO. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 197 6, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintifffs mobile home was situated at 155 South 12 00 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minor's only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
4 
15 
same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
746 West 600 North, Orem,. Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr, Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties, 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant. 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties' 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital 
relationship. 
11 
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00 
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint. 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150*00 representing $400*00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minorfs school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant. 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
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(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this y day of Jtegwb, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University-
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84 603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, ; 
v ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ; 
AMENDED 
I DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) No. CV 87 2408 
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This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day 
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having 
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
her marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
his marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall 
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in 
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a 
$400.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00 
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is 
hereby awarded the remainder of each account. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More 
particularly described as: 
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to 
Plaintiff. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right, 
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements 
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and 
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or 
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted 
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the 
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold, 
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment with the federal government during the marital 
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the 
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments 
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the 
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by 
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such 
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her 
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share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant 
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund 
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant 
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in 
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her, 
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby 
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff!s reasonable attorney's fees 
the sum of $1000.00. /J , 
Dated this ^ 7<->f_ day of Auguot, 1989, 
Approved as to form: 
Ra* 
Ju^e^ 
Fourth Judicial Distric 
Utah County 
